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ABSTRACT
Distributed ledger technology disrupts traditional business organ-
izations by introducing new business entities without the directors
and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerg-
ing entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may
suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to
catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our Article examines
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key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed
entities must be carefully structured to function effectively.
This Article breaks new ground by critically examining distributed
entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when
distributed ledger technology solves a unique corporate governance
problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly
learned through past governance failures.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (The DAO)
raised more than $168 million and emerged as “the largest
crowdfunded project ever.”1 Its creators pitched a radical business
innovation—a leaderless, decentralized venture capital firm that
would allow investors to vote on and collectively fund proposals.2
Investors purchased digital share tokens, referred to as DAO to-
kens, with ether, a cryptocurrency designed to enable decentralized
applications such as The DAO on the Ethereum platform.3
The DAO offered a novel solution to traditional agency cost
problems. In corporate structures, investors suffer when manage-
ment and directors divert corporate resources to themselves. The
1. Cade Metz, The Biggest Crowdfunding Project Ever—The DAO—Is Kind of a Mess,
WIRED (June 6, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/biggest-crowdfunding-project-
ever-dao-mess/ [https://perma.cc/HY3C-YUL9].
2. See id.
3. Much like bitcoin, ether is a decentralized crypto-token that can be used to build
applications on and be transferred on the Ethereum protocol, a type of decentralized ledger
technology. See Nathaniel Popper, Move Over, Bitcoin. Ether Is the Digital Currency of the
Moment., N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/
business/dealbook/ethereum-bitcoin-digital-currency.html [https://perma.cc/N4SS-JF6M].
Initially, investors could buy DAO tokens only in exchange for ether. See Joon Ian Wong, The
Price of Ether, a Bitcoin Rival, Is Soaring Because of a Radical, $150 Million Experiment,
QUARTZ (May 20, 2016), http://qz.com/688194/the-price-of-ether-a-bitcoin-rival-is-soaring-
because-of-a-radical-150-million-experiment/ [https://perma.cc/7S7S-DXJS]. However, begin-
ning in late May of 2016, DAO tokens began trading on cryptocurrency exchanges, including
through direct exchanges for dollars. See Ian Kar, Coinbase Will Start Trading Bitcoin Rival
Ethereum on its Cryptocurrency Exchange, QUARTZ (May 19, 2016), https://qz.com/687482/
coinbase-will-start-trading-bitcoin-rival-etherum-on-its-cryptocurrency-exchange/ [https://
perma.cc/5RYS-T9DM]. We note here that we are aware of a debate in the literature and
among technologists regarding whether the appropriate term is decentralized ledger technol-
ogy, distributed ledger technology, and/or blockchain. Without intending to take a stand on
the technical aspects of that debate, or the merits of any side, in this Article we use the term
distributed ledger technology (DLT) to refer to the broadest set of technology, including:
permissioned DLT, permission-less DLT, those protocols that are literally a chain of blocks
(blockchains) and newly emerging protocols such as R3’s Corda™. See Tim Swanson, A Brief
History of R3—the Distributed Ledger Group, GREAT WALL OF NUMBERS (Feb. 27, 2017),
http://www.ofnumbers.com/2017/02/27/a-brief-history-of-r3-the-distributed-ledger-group/
[https://perma.cc/B5WZ-89G5]. We do so, as legal academics, because the law, and the policies
it serves, must consider the full range of the technology. We do, however, occasionally use the
terms decentralized and blockchain to refer to specific protocols where the use of those more
specific terms are appropriate. For a more complete discussion of DLT and distributed
applications, see infra Part I. 
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DAO sidestepped this problem by substituting code for the directors
and officers. Instead of relying on management’s loyalty, The DAO
gave investors algorithmic certainty: once investors voted to back a
proposal, The DAO would operate and disperse funds as its code
specified.4 Tokenholders could even vote on governance proposals to
shape The DAO’s rules, much like how shareholders now vote on
corporate governance matters.5
Investors hoped The DAO would democratize venture capital’s
elite processes.6 Often, only the wealthiest and most connected place
assets with venture capital firms. Even then, investors surrender
control to the venture capitalists.7 The implicit biases of these ven-
ture capitalists (who are largely white males) may even distort the
economic landscape for entrepreneurs, causing female founders to
behave strategically and obscure their gender.8 Backers bet that The
DAO could harness the wisdom of crowds, drive innovation, and
grant developers access to capital without submitting to the con-
straints imposed by traditional Silicon Valley venture capital firms.9
More critical voices cautioned against betting on crowd-sourced
wisdom. They pointed out that The DAO’s governance structure
created a bias toward funding even unwise projects.10 When pre-
sented with an unwise proposal, a tokenholder faces a critical choice
between exiting the governance structure and voicing her opinion.11
Rather than voting on an unwise proposal, a tokenholder could sim-
ply leave The DAO.12 This exit option carries less risk than losing
4. See Seth Bannon, The Tao of “The DAO” or: How the Autonomous Corporation Is
Already Here, TECHCRUNCH (May 16, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/16/the-tao-of-the-
dao-or-how-the-autonomous-corporation-is-already-here/ [https://perma.cc/RQZ7-XRDY].
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See Rolfe Winkler, Venture-Capital Firms Draw a Rush of New Money, WALL STREET
J. (Mar. 29, 2016, 7:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/funds-flow-to-venture-firms-14592
95426 [https://perma.cc/WJU4-LVB8].
8. See John Greathouse, Why Women in Tech Might Consider Just Using Their Initials
Online, WALL STREET J.: THE EXPERTS (Sept. 28, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
experts/2016/09/28/why-women-in-tech-might-consider-just-using-their-initials-online/
[https://perma.cc/9TS5-85A9].
9. See Nathaniel Popper, A Venture Fund with Plenty of Virtual Capital, but No Capital-
ist, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (May 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/business/deal
book/crypto-ether-bitcoin-currency.html [https://perma.cc/UU6M-VBUP].
10. See Metz, supra note 1.
11. See id. 
12. See id.
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capital to other tokenholders in the grip of foolish manias.13 If
cautious tokenholders depart instead of voting, funding decisions
would show a positive bias.14
Despite the concerns, The DAO raised more capital than its
creators had thought possible.15 Its runaway success drove signifi-
cant increases in the value of ether, which is the cryptocurrency
that fuels Ethereum (the distributed application platform upon
which The DAO was built).16 While a single ether traded for approx-
imately $0.90 in December 2015, its exchange rate rose to nearly
$15 by May 2016.17
As The DAO collected capital, Christoph Jentzsch, its principal
coder, warned that the experiment remained “fraught with risks.”18
He explained that if he had known the size it would grow to, “the
tester” in him would have said “I need more testing” to check The
DAO’s code.19 Given the millions at stake, investors and outside
critics also scrutinized the code for security vulnerabilities that The
DAO should address before moving forward.20
In hindsight, the code needed more testing. On June 17, 2016, an
unknown person withdrew ether worth approximately $55 million
from The DAO by exploiting flaws in the code.21 While most viewed
this exploit as theft, a person purporting to be responsible argued
that she had rightfully appropriated The DAO’s assets under The
DAO’s own terms.22 In particular, The DAO’s offering documentation
13. See id.
14. See id. 
15. See Popper, supra note 9.
16. See Charles Bovaird, Ether Price Surges 50% as The DAO Draws Trading Interest,
COINDESK (May 20, 2016, 10:39 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/ether-surges-dao-trading-
interest/ [https://perma.cc/Z6XT-V55G].
17. See Wong, supra note 3. 
18. Popper, supra note 9.
19. Id.
20. See Nathaniel Popper, Paper Points Up Flaws in Venture Fund Based on Virtual
Money, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (May 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/business/
dealbook/paper-points-up-flaws-in-venture-fund-based-on-virtual-money.html [https://perma.
cc/3RVP-9KJ9].
21. See Steven Norton, Downfall of DAO Digital Currency Fund Shows Blockchain
Reputational Risk, WALL STREET J.: CIO J. (June 20, 2016, 6:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
cio/2016/06/20/downfall-of-dao-digital-currency-fund-shows-blockchain-reputational-risk/
[https://perma.cc/F7Z6-HCWQ].
22. See Letter from “The Attacker” to The DAO and the Ethereum Community (June 18,
2016, 5:21 AM), http://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG [https://perma.cc/483L-URJ7] (purporting to
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had made clear that The DAO’s governing terms were “set forth in
the smart contract code” and that “all explanatory terms or de-
scriptions are merely offered for educational purposes and do not
super[s]ede or modify the express terms of The DAO’s code.”23 From
the hacker’s perspective, she held legal title to funds withdrawn
under The DAO’s express terms.24
The broader community disagreed and sought to unravel the
transfer. To return the funds, the community implemented a “hard
fork”: it created a new version of the Ethereum protocol that allowed
The DAO’s tokenholders to recover their funds and collectively
abandoned the original version of the Ethereum protocol.25 The
move required broad consensus, and, at present, not all community
members have moved to the new protocol.26 The original Ethereum
blockchain continues as “Ethereum classic” with its related ether
trading at a vastly reduced price.27
This Article aims to learn from The DAO’s failure. What are the
potential strengths and weaknesses of decentralized business
organizations that distribute corporate governance? This Article
considers distributed entities from a corporate governance perspec-
tive. While we believe that, if carefully constructed, such entities
may succeed, stakeholders should not adopt distributed governance
structures merely for the sake of decentralization. Rather, stake-
holders should consider distributed governance structures when
doing so solves a particular structural or governance problem.
Furthermore, stakeholders must structure distributed corporate
entities carefully to avoid known pitfalls. To lay the groundwork, we
first discuss traditional corporate governance features, as well as
be from “The Attacker”).
23. Id. (“[T]o the extent you believe there to be any conflict or discrepancy between the
descriptions offered here and the functionality of The DAO’s code ... The DAO’s code
controls.”).
24. See id.
25. See Michael del Castillo, Ethereum Executes Blockchain Hard Fork to Return DAO
Funds, COINDESK (July 20, 2016, 3:23 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-executes-block
chain-hard-fork-return-dao-investor-funds/ [https://perma.cc/3PPZ-VDQ9]. For further
discussion on distributed ledgers, see infra Part I.
26. See Jacob Eliosoff, Why Ethereum Classic Must Die, COINDESK (Aug. 17, 2016, 12:30
PM), http://www.coindesk.com/wish-ethereum-classic-quick-painless-death/ [https://perma.cc/
QS43-U4RQ].
27. See id.
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distributed ledger technology’s unique characteristics and the move
towards distributed applications and governance. We then discuss
key considerations for stakeholders considering distributed entities.
Ultimately, stakeholders should proceed carefully and only opt for
distributed entities when the benefits outweigh the risks.
I. EMERGING DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY
Significant hype surrounds cryptocurrencies and the distributed
ledger technology (DLT) upon which they operate.28 Many discus-
sions of cryptocurrencies and DLT begin without discussing the
technology’s nature, its genuinely new and disruptive aspects, or
why those disruptive aspects should be applied to a specific context.
Because the DLT’s architecture informs our consideration of disrup-
tive corporate governance, we begin with a concise introduction to
DLT and two of the disruptive structures DLT enables: distributed
applications and distributed governance.
A. Distributed Ledger Technology
DLT refers to distributed computer software running on peer-to-
peer networks29 that offers a transparent30 record management
28. See, e.g., The Blockchain in Finance: Hype Springs Eternal, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19,
2016), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21695068-distributed-ledgers-
are-future-their-advent-will-be-slow-hype-springs [https://perma.cc/G2AL-J7HR] (discussing
the hype surrounding distributed ledger technologies).
29. See WILLIAM MOUGAYAR, THE BUSINESS BLOCKCHAIN: PROMISE, PRACTICE, AND
APPLICATION OF THE NEXT INTERNET TECHNOLOGY 3 (2016) (citing SATOSHI NAKAMOTO,
BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2008)).
30. We use the term “transparent” instead of “public” in this Article to define the nature
of the ledger. Consistent with one of the coauthor’s other work, we made this word choice in
order to keep the definition of DLT broad enough to encompass both permission-less and
permissioned ledgers. For further explanation of the rationale for the choice, see generally
Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). The permis-
sion-less DLT are generally public ledgers, open for anyone to inspect. See Angela Walch, The
Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk,
18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 840 & n.15 (2015). Permissioned DLT, on the other
hand, are developed and used on a proprietary basis and are often not public. See id. We are
aware of objections to the idea of permissioned DLT; however, that debate is beyond the scope
of this Article, which offers initial considerations on the potential disruptive impact of DLT
on corporate governance. Thus, at this initial stage of inquiry, we use DLT to refer to both
permissioned and permission-less DLT, and distinguish between the two by specific reference
8
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system in which transactions are cryptographically signed and val-
idated with timestamps using a consensus mechanism.31 In other
words, at its core, DLT is a technology that no single entity, person,
or computer node owns, controls, or otherwise maintains,32 but that
nevertheless “permanently records transactions in a way that
cannot be later erased but can only be sequentially updated, in es-
sence keeping a never-ending historical trail.”33 Although the exact
combination of these elements varies among specific DLT implemen-
tations, most DLTs employ cryptographic proofs and a consensus
mechanism to ensure the accuracy and security of transactions.34
Specifically, DLTs use three concepts from the science of cryptog-
raphy to secure and confirm transactions. First, DLTs use hashes as
“a unique fingerprint that helps to verify that a certain piece of
information has not been altered, without the need to actually see
where appropriate. 
31. Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi explain that blockchains achieve these
functions by “combining peer-to-peer networks, cryptographic algorithms, distributed data
storage, and ... decentralized consensus mechanisms.” Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi,
Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia 4-5 (Mar. 12, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664 [https://perma.cc/V2MF-JSSQ].
In other words, this Article
uses the term[ ] decentralized ledger technology [DLT] to refer broadly to dis-
tributed network technology that (1) enables users to upload programs and to
leave the programs to self-execute; (2) maintains a permanent and public record
(ledger) of the current and past states of every program; (3) is decentralized;
(4) uses public key cryptography for authentication; and (5) uses economic
incentives to ensure that the network maintains the technology.
Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger
Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 191 n.1 (2016) (emphasis
omitted) (citing Vitalik Buterin, Visions, Part 1: The Value of Blockchain Technology,
ETHEREUM BLOG (Apr. 13, 2015), https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/13/visions-part-1-the-
value-of-blockchain-technology/ [https://perma.cc/F3RB-E4TA]). 
32. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-
Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2014) (“Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer software sys-
tem, which means, practically speaking, that the entire system is made up of versions of the
software that end-users download and run on their personal computers. There is no Bitcoin
server or Bitcoin company that directly manages the system.” (emphasis omitted)).
33. MOUGAYAR, supra note 29, at xxi; see also Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin
Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2014); Kevin
Werbach, Trustless Trust 2 (Aug. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2844409 [https://perma.cc/SS2H-5MUX].
34. See MOUGAYAR, supra note 29, at xxiii (“In essence, trust is replaced by cryptographic
proofs, and trust is maintained by a network of trusted computers (honest nodes) that ensure
its security, as contrasted with single entities who create overhead or unnecessary bureau-
cracy around it.”).
9
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it.”35 Second, DLT implementations use cryptographic keys to en-
sure only the owner of an asset recorded on DLT can access the
asset.36 Cryptographic keys will always exist “in at least a combina-
tion of two: a public and a private one.”37 The public key serves as
an address that anyone can see and send transactions to, while the
private key allows the owner of the key pair to decrypt the informa-
tion sent to that address.38 Thus, cryptographic keys allow DLT
users to securely transact with persons and entities that they do not
know or trust, without using a trusted intermediary.39 Third, most
DLTs verify entries pushed to the ledger by a cryptographic key pair
through a consensus mechanism.40 “The basic premise is that all
nodes control each other all the time and they can do that because
they know exactly what every other node should hold as truth at
any given time. If all nodes agree, this is called consensus.”41 In oth-
er words, “[e]very node in a blockchain stores and computes the
same data.”42 A variety of consensus mechanisms exist, including
the Bitcoin blockchain’s well-known proof-of-work mining consensus
process, which
allows participants to add new financial records to the authorita-
tive sequence by demonstrating that they have expended com-
puting power on an otherwise unimportant, repetitive task. This
process, known as Bitcoin mining, confers the right to add a
35. Id. at 12. 
36. See id. 
37. Id. 
38. See id.; see also Reyes, supra note 31, at 200. The public key might be thought of as
an email address to which anyone may send messages, while the private key might be thought
of as the password that allows the sender to originate a message from the email account. See
MOUGAYAR, supra note 29, at 12.
39. See Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 372 (2016)
(“A mathematical technique can be used to quickly generate two keys of a specific length ...
[such that] anyone who knows the relevant algorithms and the public key can conclude, with
near certainty, that someone who knew the private key corresponding to the public key must
have performed the encryption.”). 
40. See Sigrid Seibold & George Samman, Consensus: Immutable Agreement for the Inter-
net of Value, KPMG 2 (2016), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/06/kpmg-
blockchain-consensus-mechanism.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HFS-JDJV]; see also Abramowicz,
supra note 39, at 373 (describing the Bitcoin blockchain solution for verifying transactions by
consensus).
41. HENNING DIEDRICH, ETHEREUM 20 (2016). 
42. Id. at 33.
10
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record to the sequence (and also, not incidentally, it is rewarded
by the creation of new bitcoins, partly as an incentive to partici-
pate in the network and partly as a way to manage the initial
distribution of bitcoins). In the event of a dispute among
different candidate sequences of transactions, the one that is
eventually backed by the most computing power wins.43 
The Bitcoin blockchain thus relies on the expense and difficulty
of proof-of-work to deter cheating and fraudulent verification.44
Other consensus mechanisms power other DLT variations, including
“unique node list” consensus, proof-of-stake, and several others.45 In
each case, consensus replaces the traditional trusted third-party
intermediary as the method for maintaining the ledger.46
B. Smart Contracts
In addition to disrupting the traditional centralized ledger model,
DLTs also enable complex relationships to be layered into, or on top
of, the underlying DLT protocol.47 Nick Szabo first named these
complex relationships enabled by computer code “smart contracts”
in 1994.48 Although the term “contract” in the “smart contract”
43. Bayern, supra note 32, at 1490-91 (footnote omitted); see also ANDREAS M.
ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN xx (2015) (defining a miner as “[a] network node that
finds valid proof of work for new blocks, by repeated hashing”); PEDRO FRANCO, UNDERSTAND-
ING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND ECONOMICS 103 (2015) (“To secure the
blockchain—the distributed transaction database—Bitcoin requires proof-of-work to be
performed on blocks of transactions following the Solution-Verification protocol.”).
44. See Werbach, supra note 33, at 26; see also Walch, supra note 30, at 846 (“When a
bitcoin is transferred to another party, all the computers that run the Bitcoin software
(referred to as ‘nodes’) work together to verify that the party seeking to transfer that bitcoin
has not already transferred it to someone else.”).
45. For a more complete description of the proof-of-work consensus mechanism and the
other possible forms of consensus, see Reyes, supra note 30 (manuscript at 8-13); see also
MOUGAYAR, supra note 29, at 25; Wright & De Filippi, supra note 31, at 5-7.
46. See Sloane Brakeville & Bhargav Perepa, Blockchain Basics: Introduction to Distrib-
uted Ledgers (May 9, 2016), http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cloud/library/cl-blockchain-
basics-intro-bluemix-trs/index.html [https://perma.cc/UZ4F-4B3F].
47. We note here that not all DLT protocols are created equal. Some decentralized proto-
cols support more robust smart contract functionality than others, and some distributed
protocols do not support smart contracts at all. See Werbach, supra note 33, at 31.
48. See generally Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts (1994), http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/
Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.n
et/smart.contracts.html [https://perma.cc/X9WQ-53B5] (discussing what smart contracts are
and their utility). Szabo defines smart contracts as “a computerized transaction protocol that
11
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phrase often confuses lawyers, understanding Szabo’s concept
requires disassociating smart contracts from legal contracts.49
Instead, a smart contract is, at its core, “a computer protocol—an
algorithm—that can self-execute, self-enforce, self-verify, and self-
constrain the performance of ” its instructions.50 Szabo himself con-
sidered a digital cash protocol to constitute an example of a smart
contract.51 In other words, the Bitcoin blockchain itself is a smart
contract used for the transfer of digital value.52 More complex smart
executes the terms of a contract.” Id.
49. See MOUGAYAR, supra note 29, at 42 (“Smart contracts are not the same as a
contractual agreement. If we stick to Nick Szabo’s original idea, smart contracts help make
the breach of an agreement expensive because they control a real-world valuable property via
‘digital means.’ So, a smart contract can enforce a functional implementation of a particular
requirement, and can show proof that certain conditions were met or not met.”).
50. TIM SWANSON, GREAT CHAIN OF NUMBERS: A GUIDE TO SMART CONTRACTS, SMART
PROPERTY, AND TRUSTLESS ASSET MANAGEMENT 16 (2014); see also MELANIE SWAN,
BLOCKCHAIN: BLUEPRINT FOR A NEW ECONOMY 16 (2015) (“[A] smart contract is both defined
by the code and executed (or enforced) by the code, automatically without discretion.”).
51. See Szabo, supra note 48.
52. See, e.g., Werbach, supra note 33, at 30 (“Distributed ledgers are active, not passive.
In other words, they do not simply record information passed to them. They are part of a
consensus system, so they must ensure that recorded transactions are actually completed to
match the consensus. For Bitcoin, that means the system self-enforces financial transfers. I
can’t initiate a transaction promising to send you Bitcoin and then renege; the synch-
ronization that reconciles and completes the transfer is part of the process. This mechanism
is known as a smart contract. Both the specification of rights and obligations, and the
execution of that contractual agreement, occur through the platform.” (footnotes omitted)).
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contracts can be created,53 and often software developers choose to
create such complex smart contracts on the Ethereum protocol.
The Ethereum protocol’s creators specifically designed it to en-
able smart contract functionality.54 One writer explains, “Ethereum
has its focus on smart contracts instead of being exclusively a digital
currency. And as part of that, Ethereum transactions can be ... more
sophisticated than Bitcoin’s: full-fledged, high language programs,
some many thousand lines long, which can call on each other,
almost ad infinitum.”55 Smart contracts, whether on the Ethereum
protocol or not, need not be limited to use in the realm of digital
cash. Instead, smart contracts are tools of general application that
offer unique and powerful elements of autonomy, self-sufficiency,
53. See MOUGAYAR, supra note 29, at 43 (“Smart contracts are not the same as blockchain
applications. Smart contracts are usually part of a decentralized (blockchain) application.”);
SWAN, supra note 50, at 16 (“In the blockchain context, contracts or smart contracts mean
blockchain transactions that go beyond simple buy/sell currency transactions, and may have
more extensive instructions embedded into them.”); Werbach, supra note 33, at 30-31 (“Adding
richer programming capabilities to blockchain transactions adds security risks and various
other complexities. On the other hand, a smart contract engine on the blockchain creates
enticing possibilities. In technical terms, smart contracts are essentially autonomous software
agents. With smart contracts, a distributed ledger becomes functionally a distributed
computer.”). Note that we use “smart contracts” in the technological sense of the term. The
term “smart contracts” as used with reference to DLT is often confused with terms used to
describe contracts that involve computer code in some way. Although smart contracts may be
part of these other forms of computerized contracts, they are distinct concepts. For a
description of one kind of computerized contract outside of the DLT context, see Lauren Henry
Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 107-
09). Scholz’s article argues that
algorithmic contracts are contracts in which an algorithm determines a party’s
obligations[, and explains that] some contracts are algorithmic because[: (1)] the
parties used algorithms as negotiators before contract formation, choosing which
terms to offer or accept[; and] other[s] are algorithmic because [(2)] the parties
agree that an algorithm to be run at some time after the contract [is formed] will
serve as a gap-filler.”
Id. (manuscript at 101).
54. See MOUGAYAR, supra note 29, at 43 (noting that Ethereum uses a specific smart
contract language (Solidity), enabling coders to write complex processes in a short span of
code); Werbach, supra note 33, at 31 (“Newer blockchain platforms remove Bitcoin’s
limitations on smart contracts. The most prominent is Ethereum, which launched in 2015.
Ethereum offers a Turing-complete programming language, meaning that in theory, any
application that runs on a conventional computer can be executed on the distributed computer
of its consensus network. Ethereum is designed as a complete smart contract platform,
including development tools and a browser.” (footnotes omitted)).
55. DIEDRICH, supra note 41, at 39.
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and distributed architecture.56 Essentially, smart contracts enable
parties to structure relationships in a self-enforcing way, such that
the parties no longer need a trusted intermediary to carry out the
mandates of the relationships or to ensure that the mandates are
properly interpreted. In short, complex layers of interacting smart
contracts may enable distributed governance.
C. Distributed Governance
Corporate governance refers to the mechanisms within business
organizations for addressing “managerial accountability, board
structure and shareholder rights.”57 Typically contemplating the
default statutory model of a multi-member body that acts collegially
rather than a single hierarch,58 “the corporate governance industry
influences (and in some cases effectively controls) the votes of tril-
lions of dollars of equity.”59 Accordingly, it impacts “the governance
policies and fortunes of countless companies through proxy voting
recommendations and governance ratings.”60 The reason for this is
that corporate governance is the mechanism by which business
organizations oversee, execute, and maintain a complex series of
interacting agreements between the organization’s different stake-
holders.61 In examining these agreements throughout the years,
corporate governance scholars have focused considerable attention
on attempting to design methods of assessing whether a business
56. See Reyes, supra note 31, at 16-17.
57. See Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46, 46 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013). 
58. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002).
59. Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 887 (2007).
60. Id.
61. In examining these issues over the last couple of decades, much of the corporate
governance scholarship has focused on the connection between better corporate governance
and firm market value, firm performance, stock market development, and economic growth.
See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD.
783, 786 (2009) (finding that certain provisions entrenching managers appear to also
negatively influence “firm valuation and stockholder returns”); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FINANCE 1131, 1139 (1997) (finding that “the results
on debt, like those on equity, suggest that legal rules influence external finance”); Ross
Levine, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 8, 24 (1999) (“[T]he
legal and regulatory environment materially affect financial intermediary development.”).
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organization has good governance mechanisms and agreements in
place.62
DLT and smart contracts may disrupt traditional structures for
managing these interacting agreements. Smart contracts, embedded
in and layered upon DLT, offer the opportunity for autonomously
operating software to oversee, execute, and maintain a series of in-
teracting agreements, “not as an intermediary for individuals or
companies, but rather, in a functionally meaningful sense, in its
own right.”63
Early experiments with this and related (but subtler) forms of dis-
tributed governance mechanisms are already underway. For exam-
ple, the Robin Hood Coop, based in Tampere, Finland, is a legally
organized investment cooperative that uses DLT-based software to
manage cooperative assets to generate wealth for its members.64
The Robin Hood Coop “use[s] financial technologies to democratize
finance, expand financial inclusion and generate new economic
space.”65 In another example, a company based in Germany,
KOINA, AG, uses “a proprietary smartchain” to offer a contractual
monetary system that “enables producers to issue credit which
62. Many believe that corporate governance rankings and indices offer a uniform scale for
evaluating a company’s governance. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of
Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1807 (2008) (“Today, a market for
corporate governance ratings exists.”); Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-
Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 432-33 (2008) (analyzing the Anti-Self-Dealing Index); Ronald
J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 329 (1996) (analyzing “the hypothesized link between corporate gover-
nance and economic efficiency through two different lenses that highlight the role of national
institutions: path dependency and industrial organization”); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1127 (1998) (analyzing the Antidirector Rights Index);
Jonathan R. Macey, Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems:
Toward a More Scientific Approach, in THE REVOLUTION OF CORPORATE FINANCE 579, 588
(Joel M. Stern & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2003) (“[S]uggest[ing] [three] ways for
measuring the performance of a corporate governance system.”); Robert Daines et al., Rating
the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings? 11 (Stanford Univ. Sch. Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 360, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152093 [https://
perma.cc/R4DC-UJJZ] (exploring governance ratings from three rating firms). 
63. Bayern, supra note 32, at 1486. In other words, smart contracts and DLT “make way
for software that could be programmed to act as if it were conducting business on its own
account.” Id. at 1492.
64. See David Bollier, The Robin Hood Coop, an Activist Hedge Fund, DAVID BOLLIER:
NEWS AND PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMMONS (Nov. 20, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://www.bollier.org/
blog/robin-hood-coop-activist-hedge-fund [https://perma.cc/7HF9-Y7LQ]. 
65. Id.
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allows them to finance their future production independently.”66
These are examples of attempts to use forms of distributed gov-
ernance enabled by smart contracts and DLT to radically alter the
economic model pursued by current governance structures. Other
efforts offer subtler forms of distributed governance. Otonomos,
based in Singapore, uses a DLT-enabled platform to offer online
business incorporation, capital raising, and governance.67 Otono-
mos’s software replaces each paper process required for incorpora-
tion, raising capital, and corporate governance with secure software
keys and smart contracts.68 Calling a business incorporated through
their software a “Blockchain Chartered Company,” Otonomos en-
sures that the result of the wholly online, DLT-based process is the
legally valid incorporation of the company.69
These examples offer insight into the breadth and depth of the
disruption that DLT-enabled distributed governance may introduce
to the commercial system. However, this disruption should not be
pursued for disruption’s sake. Recognizing the potential for disrup-
tion but wary of adopting new technology merely because it is new,
this Article offers an initial investigation into both the areas where
DLT may benefit corporate governance models and the risks
inherent in applying DLT in this context.
II. THE PROMISE AND THE PERILS
Much like the Internet before it, DLT may significantly alter law
and the business environment. While some skeptics may view focus-
ing on law relevant to DLT as useful as focusing on the “law of the
horse,”70 we believe that useful insights come from considering how
66. KOINA, https://koina.cc/ [https://perma.cc/KRC8-X9NZ]. 
67. See OTONOMOS, https://www.otonomos.com [https://perma.cc/9MQY-W38H].
68. See id.
69. See Han Verstraete, Decentralisation: The “Stargate” Between Pushing Paper Locally
and Moving Data Globally, OTONOMOS (Jan. 26, 2009), https://www.otonomos.com/decen
tralisation-the-stargate-between-pushing-paper-locally-and-moving-data-globally/ [https://
perma.cc/NP9U-WP8W]. Currently, Otonomos offers its services for creating and incorpora-
ting companies in five jurisdictions (Singapore, Hong Kong, United Kingdom, BVI, and the
Cayman Islands) with announced plans to expand to offer C-Corporation services in Delaware.
See Start Now, OTONOMOS, https://www.otonomos.com/start-now/ [https://perma.cc/58YR-
R3TS].
70. The “law of the horse” is a term Frank Easterbrook coined in reference to the law of
cyberspace, quipping that the law of cyberspace is merely a specialized endeavor to which
16
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 59 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/1
2017] DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE 17
these emerging entities differ and may challenge traditional legal
structures.71 Specifically, we believe that, like the lessons that have
emerged from the study of the interaction between “law and
cyberspace,” examining the interaction between existing corporate
governance law and DLT-enabled distributed governance mecha-
nisms will teach “about the limits on law as a regulator and about
the techniques for escaping those limits,” and it will require us to
take a closer look at “the collection of tools that a society has at
hand for affecting constraints upon behavior”72 of corporations.
A. Unique Benefits
1. New Business and Political Governance Structures
Writing about the biased nature of technologies, political scientist
Langdon Winner’s controversial thesis, that technologies have
politics embodying social relations, has inspired significant debate.73
Winner argued that technology both emerges from and creates so-
cial foundations.74 While some technologies may promote democratic
social relationships, others favor autocracy.75 Winner's ideas provide
a frame for considering how DLT and smart contracts may shape
business entities. Under Winner’s thesis, technologies have politics
in two ways: either (1) “the invention, design, or arrangement of a
specific technical device or system becomes a way of settling an
issue in the affairs of a particular community”; or (2) the systems
are “inherently political technologies,” which “appear to require or
to be strongly compatible with particular kinds of political relation-
ships,” technical arrangements, and social order.76
general legal rules could be applied as problems arise on a case by case basis, rather than a
separate area of law. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (“[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors
is to study general rules.”).
71. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (“[T]here is an important general point that comes from thinking in
particular about how law and cyberspace connect.”).
72. Id.
73. See LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE
OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 21-22 (1986).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 25.
76. Id. at 22.
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This is hardly surprising. As people adapt to technologies, their
everyday practices, feelings, and even their identities and senses of
self may shift, often in unanticipated ways. The most commonly
cited example from Winner’s work involves the segregationist
politics embodied in the “height ... of the bridges over the park ways
on Long Island, New York.”77 According to Winner, Robert Moses
designed these bridges to “discourage the presence of buses.”78 “One
consequence was to limit access of racial minorities and low-income
groups to Jones Beach, Moses’ widely acclaimed public park.”79
Nevertheless, Winner argues that “to recognize the political dimen-
sions in the shapes of technology does not require that we look for
conscious conspiracies or malicious intentions.”80 There are many
cases in which “the technological deck has been stacked in advance
to favor certain social interests,” although this stacking was not
necessarily consciously designed by anyone.81 One example Winner
gives for such a situation is the failure to accommodate for disabled
individuals that resulted “more from long-standing neglect than
from anyone’s active intention.”82
DLT may offer new dimensions to Winner’s paradigm by being
both a technology that can be used to settle a community’s issues
and a technology that can be shaped and used for any number of
political relationships. First, DLT may be used to settle corporate
governance disputes by enabling all stakeholders to participate and
all leaders to manage and conduct their affairs in broad daylight as
a peer among peers. In other words, DLT offers a mechanism for
77. Id. at 22-23.
78. Id. at 23.
79. Id. Winner gives other examples of consciously political design, such as (1) “Baron
Haussmann’s broad Parisian thoroughfares, engineered at Louis Napoleon’s direction to pre-
vent any recurrence of street fighting of the kind that took place during the revolution of
1848,” (2) “concrete buildings and huge plazas constructed on university campuses in the
United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s to defuse student demonstrations,” and
(3) Cyrus McCormick’s introduction of pneumatic molding machines into his Chicago reaper
manufacturing plant in the 1880s, in order to “‘weed out’ ... the skilled workers who had
organized [a local union].” Id. at 23-24.
80. Id. at 25.
81. Id. at 26.
82. Id. at 25. Another notable example is the introduction of mechanical tomato
harvesters, which inspired the breeding of “new varieties of tomatoes that are” able to better
handle the machinery’s rough motion. See id. at 26. The combination of new equipment and
new tomato breeds has had a dramatic effect on farm communities, which have been displaced
by large agri-businesses. See id. at 26-27.
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radical transparency that puts governance actions on display in an
immutable ledger.83 Such transparency can also help change unde-
sired corporate governance norms and culture in business organiza-
tions.84 Second, DLT may change the way we think about corporate
governance decision-making altogether. DLT enables business
governance structures that are more transparent, more flat, and
more participatory.85 For example, Backfeed offers a decentralized
protocol based in DLT that allows people to govern, collaborate, and
cooperate without a centralized authority or agency.86 Backfeed
incorporates a peer-to-peer evaluation mechanism called the Repu-
tation Score, and participants earn increasing rewards correspond-
ing to their contributions.87 The protocol’s algorithm takes data from
these elements and “ensure[s] a fair distribution of the generated
value to each individual, according to the perceived value of their
respective contribution to the organization as a whole.”88 The
Backfeed protocol thus enables new business governance structures:
they originate among the workers but are objectively valued by
management in light of the clear data evidence in the protocol.89
83. See Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Democracy: Government Of The People, By The People,
For The People, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2016, 2:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alextapscott/
2016/08/16/blockchain-democracy-government-of-the-people-by-the-people-for-the-people/
#39e35d6e1fb5 [https://perma.cc/55XK-7RW3] (listing other types of democratic improvements
that can result from using the new technology).
84. On the importance of corporate culture as it relates to transparency, corporate gov-
ernance, and a business organization’s success, see Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P.
Edwards, Regulating Culture: Improving Corporate Governance with Anti-Arbitration Provi-
sions for Whistleblowers, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 41, 64 (2016) (arguing, inter alia,
that a focus on corporate culture has emerged as a regulatory, public, and media priority, and
explaining that “[g]iven the importance of business culture in our modern society, and the con-
sequences that such culture and behavioral norms have, it is extremely important to nudge
individuals as well as businesses to promote increased norms of accountability and transpar-
ency.”).
85. Yochai Benkler and others have written about how technology now enables peers to
produce goods without traditional hierarchical structures. See generally Yochai Benkler et al.,
Peer Production: A Form of Collective Intelligence, in HANDBOOK OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
(Thomas Malone & Michael Bernstein eds., 2015) (exploring the development of peer produc-
tion literature). Distributed entities may advance this dynamic further.
86. See Explore in Depth, BACKFEED, http://backfeed.cc/explore-in-depth [https://perma.cc/
C4AT-NQLK].
87. See id.
88. See BACKFEED, DECENTRALIZED VALUE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOR BLOCKCHAIN-BASED
APPLICATIONS 1, http://backfeed.cc/assets/docs/TechnicalSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YV4-
N22D].
89. See generally David Shamah, Backfeed Seeks to Make the Workplace—and the
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Backfeed’s creators believe that working under governance struc-
tures of their own design will make people more invested in their
work and drive increases in both production and quality.90
New technologies may also promote democratic agendas. For
example, solar power may be a particularly democratic technology
because of its decentralized nature.91 Solar power can operate at
multiple sites and needs little monetary investment per site and far
less technical expertise than other systems.92 Winner argues that no
hierarchical social structures need to be created or maintained to
deploy solar technology.93 It is indeed inherently democratic and
populist.94 Similarly, scholars have argued that DLT may also pro-
mote democratic goals by lowering the social and economic barriers
certain populations face. Notably, women in developing countries
often lack social and financial freedom.95 DLT may grant increased
independence to these populations by allowing them to bypass
traditional intermediaries and gatekeepers.96 Likewise, many
believe that the new “technology can be applied to help modernize
the democratic process” and “usher in digital democracy” by remov-
ing barriers to and improving the governance of voting systems.97
World—More Fair, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.timesofisrael.com/backfeed-
seeks-to-make-the-workplace-more-fair/ [https://perma.cc/UQ8T-A55U] (discussing manage-
ment models that emulate the Backfeed decentralized system).
90. See id.
91. See WINNER, supra note 73, at 32.
92. See id. at 32-33.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See Tanaya Macheel, How Bitcoin Helps Afghan Girls Achieve Financial Freedom,
COINDESK (June 7, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/how-bitcoin-helps-afghan-girls-
achieve-financial-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/BVB4-JK27].
96. See id. (“If [we] can provide a platform in which women can have their own income—a
platform which pays out in bitcoin, a truly pseudonymous protocol which can truly conceal the
identity, I think that we have the potential to really shake things up.”). Many also hope that 
by earning a salary independently, the girls’ families might see their education
as a source of income and become more supportive of it.... With bitcoin, no one
other than the payee has to know that she has a bitcoin wallet. WAF can pay the
girls in a timely manner with minuscule fees. This eliminates the need to open
a bank account, which would require extensive documentation and the need for
legal guardian approval if they are underage, which could result in more diffi-
culties.
Id.
97. Danny Bradbury, How Block Chain Technology Could Usher in Digital Democracy,
COINDESK (June 16, 2014, 11:05 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/block-chain-technology-dig
ital-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/CSS5-KX3J].
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For example, distributed governance systems might make it more
difficult for management to suppress information, as often occurs
through the current shareholder proposal settlement process.98
2. Decreased Cost of Financial Intermediation
In recent studies, scholars and financial institutions have found
that application of “DLT has the potential to transform capital
market structure by encouraging new business development, im-
proving operational efficiency, and contributing to cost reduction.”99
In early 2016, experts estimated that “IT and operations expendi-
ture in capital markets ... [were] close to [$]100-[$]150 billion per
year among banks.”100 Additionally, “post-trade and securities ser-
vicing fees” were estimated at $100 billion, and tremendous “capital
and liquidity costs are also incurred as a result of current delays
and inefficiencies within market operations.”101 However, many of
these costs are the result of “redundant or duplicative systems [and]
operational overheads,” which DLT can eliminate or reduce.102
Moreover, DLT can enable “cost-sharing across institutions,” which
would be financially and operationally efficient and help to lower
businesses’ “financial resource requirements” by, for example,
98. See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of
Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262, 295 (2016) (“Social and environmental shareholder
proposals generally highlight specific societal harms caused by corporate activity, information
the company would likely prefer to suppress.”).
99. Atsushi Santo et al., Applicability of Distributed Ledger Technology to Capital Market
Infrastructure 5-6 (Japan Exch. Grp., Working Paper No. 15, 2016), https://www.finextra.com/
finextra-downloads/newsdocs/e_jpx_working_paper_no15.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QDR-UP2D];
see also PETER EVANS-GREENWOOD ET AL., DELOITTE, BITCOIN, BLOCKCHAIN & DISTRIBUTED
LEDGERS: CAUGHT BETWEEN PROMISE AND REALITY 7 (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/
dam/Deloitte/au/Images/infographics/au-deloitte-technology-bitcoin-blockchain-distributed-
ledgers-180416.pdf [https://perma.cc/GXP7-YVGL] (“[C]apital markets will be made faster and
more efficient once moved onto the blockchain. There are even proposals for creating
ownerless companies that live on the blockchain, giving these companies sovereignty over
their own assets via technologically enforced contracts—bypassing today’s sprawling and
inefficient financial back offices and legal systems.”).
100. EUROCLEAR & OLIVER WYMAN, BLOCKCHAIN IN CAPITAL MARKETS: THE PRIZE AND THE
JOURNEY 20 (2016), http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/
feb/BlockChain-In-Capital-Markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P5W-QYPB].
101. Id.
102. Id.
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minimizing “counterparty credit risk[] [so as] to drive down econom-
ic costs of business.”103
Overstock.com (Overstock) created the T Zero (T0) distributed
ledger platform for capital markets for precisely these reasons.104
The platform uses “cryptographically secure distributed ledgers
with existing market processes to reduce settlement time and costs,
increase transparency, efficiency and auditability.”105 T Zero takes
its name from the improvement it offers over traditional mecha-
nisms in terms of settlement time. “Equity transactions generally
settle three days after trade date,” often referred to as T+3.106
Overstock’s platform offers same day settlement, or T+0.107 Nasdaq
began developing its own DLT-enabled platform, Linq, to “offer
efficient, fully-electronic services that facilitate the issuance,
transfer, and management of private company securities” in mid-
2015.108 Meanwhile, any number of companies are pursuing DLT-
based solutions for “payments, lending or remittances,” with the aim
103. Id.
104. See T ZERO, https://tzero.com [https://perma.cc/65ZL-SMYF]. Note that Overstock
initially used the T Zero platform to sell a $5 million bond, or “cyptobond,” to FNY Managed
Accounts. Press Release, Overstock.com, Inc., Overstock.com and FNY Capital Conclude $5
Million Cryptobond Deal (July 31, 2015), http://investors.overstock.com/mobile.view?c=131091
&v=203&d=1&id=2073583 [https://perma.cc/25YK-NMJM]. Later, after obtaining SEC
approval, Overstock began using T Zero for crypto-equity. See Michael del Castillo, Overstock
Just Closed its First Day of Blockchain Stock Trading, CoinDesk (Dec. 16, 2016, 10:48 PM),
https://www.coindesk.com/overstock-first-day-blockchain-stock-trading/ [https://perma.cc/
KHL6-2TKK]. Technically speaking, “Overstock’s t0 platform uses the blockchain to attach
a digital token to a borrowed share of stock. The use of cryptographic token to track the
activity of the underlying share of stock gives the stock holder the ability to closely track each
transaction involving their loaned share of stock.” Working Group on Cryptographic Token,
A Primer on Cryptosecurities 2 (COALA Blockchain Workshops, Working Draft Version 1.0,
2015), http://coala.global/uploads/COALA-A-Primer-On-Cryptosecurities-Dec-2015.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5CBQ-CN5C].
105. See T ZERO, supra note 104.
106. Press Release, T Zero, T0 Platform Successfully Employed in the World’s First Public
Issuance of a Blockchain Equity (Dec. 22, 2016), https://tzero.com/news/2016/12/22/t0-plat
form-successfully-employed-in-the-worlds-first-public-issuance-of-a-blockchain-equity
[https://perma.cc/8A6G-MUAV].
107. See id. 
108. Press Release, Nasdaq, Nasdaq Launches Enterprise-Wide Blockchain Technology
Imitative (May 11, 2015), http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid-912196 [https://
perma.cc/5UD6-SLU5]. “Nasdaq’s Linq project will allow private companies to issue stock in
the form of cryptographic tokens to founders and investors. Issuance and transfer of the
tokens will be managed using the Linq dashboard.” Working Group on Cryptographic Token,
supra note 104, at 2.
22
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 59 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/1
2017] DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE 23
of reducing market inefficiencies, reducing cost, and increasing
access to financial services among the underserved.109 For example,
in the remittance context, “the cost of remitting money averages 8.4
percent globally, driven in large part by the legacy brick-and-mortar
distribution networks and multi-bank settlement chains of incum-
bents like Western Union and MoneyGram.”110 Companies like Abra
use DLT-enabled remittance protocols to offer remittances free from
sending and receiving fees.111 The hope is that such services “will
not only lead to more value accretion to remitting customers, but it
will also be the kind of radical value proposition improvement that
will be required to attract customers and break them from estab-
lished habits around sending and receiving money.”112
3. Selectively Incorporate Stakeholder Communities
DLT offers a community-based approach. It grants stakeholders
access to a shared content ledger, often revealing all changes made
by each party.113 This significantly reduces the cost of accessing in-
formation for minority stakeholders.114 Depending on the elements
of corporate governance shifted to DLT, the need for a “books and
records” action with distributed entities may diminish.
It is not surprising, therefore, that DLT’s most common applica-
tions “require the input and joint effort of multiple stakeholders,
such as industrial supply chains and financial services.”115 The
technology serves “open communities of practice, including open
markets or trade platforms, ... collaborative work environments,
such as large-scale, multiple-stakeholder and international projects,
as well as governmental projects and processes involving many
109. See Jackie Hyland, Unlocking Blockchain for the Underbanked, TECHCRUNCH
(Mar. 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/03/14/unlocking-blockchain-for-the-underbanked/
[https://perma.cc/7JZ5-BSB3] (pointing to companies such as BitPagos, Bitex.la, Bitso, Vola-
bit, Wayniloans, Blinktrade, BitPesa, Atlas, Switchless, Coins.ph, Abra, and Allaire). 
110. Id.
111. See ABRA, https://www.goabra.com/ [https://perma.cc/GYW9-YM6L]
112. Hyland, supra note 109.
113. See Schalk Burger, Blockchain Technology Can Improve Multistakeholder Process
Integrity, ENGINEERING NEWS (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/
blockchain-technology-to-improve-multi-stakeholder-process-integrity-wipro-2016-08-12/rep_
id:4136 [https://perma.cc/S2N4-K6JD].
114. See id.
115. Id.
23
Reyes et al.: Distributed Governance
Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018
24 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:001
agencies or departments.”116 Moreover, the benefit of the DLT
“arises mainly from the shared, common ledger or ‘chain of
blocks,’”117 which allows all stakeholders to be assured that all
parties in the chain rely on the same set of verified “shared facts.”118
The fact that “all stakeholders[ ] have[ ] access to the chain of events
and [its] changes makes the process transparent, which establishes
trust while working in a ‘trustless’ environment.”119
Radical transparency may not be useful in all corporate gover-
nance circumstances. As such, an entity may choose to adopt DLT-
based governance for some areas of its operations but not others.
Further, an entity may choose among DLT solutions to find the
technology with a level of transparency best suited to its purposes.
For example, the entity adopting elements of distributed governance
may opt to grant only selective stakeholders access to corporate
information and records stored in DLT. Although public blockchains
such as the Bitcoin blockchain or the Ethereum platform dominate
the discussion, it is possible to code new DLT platforms that are
structured to meet specific needs. For example, R3 CEV built its
Corda™ distributed ledger for financial transactions to restrict
access to data held within smart contracts to only the parties with
a need to know such information.120 In other words, even entities
seeking to increase the level of multi-stakeholder collaboration
within its governance structures need not adopt wholesale elements
of DLT that would act as a detriment or burden to the entity. It is
possible to customize the technology such that its most useful
aspects are adopted while its least useful aspects are minimized.
B. Governance Risks
Counterbalancing the benefits discussed above, distributed busi-
ness organizations also face significant governance challenges,
which should not be ignored. Nevertheless, careful planning and
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Richard Gendal Brown, Introducing R3 CordaTM: A Distributed Ledger Designed
for Financial Services, R3. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.r3cev.com/blog/2016/4/4/introducing-r3-
corda-a-distributed-ledger-designed-for-financial-services [https://perma.cc/BQ48-KYDR].
119. Burger, supra note 113.
120. See Brown, supra note 118.
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structuring may allow these emerging entities to overcome these
challenges and be successful. We detail some of the key governance
concerns below.
1. Difficulty of Smart Contract Coding
As The DAO’s demise illustrates, distributed business entities
face significant technical challenges, which, for the most part, are
not easily resolved. Writing about their experience in teaching
smart contract coding to undergraduate students, a group of Uni-
versity of Maryland professors explained: “In contrast to traditional
software development tasks where bugs such as buffer overflows are
often benign (except in rare or contrived scenarios), in our lab, we
observed several bugs and pitfalls that arise due to the unique
nature of smart contract programs and lead to clear and immediate
exploits.”121 Without the presence of officers or directors to oversee
and intervene in the event of a flaw or an exploit, distributed
organizations may hemorrhage assets. Most notably, a third of The
DAO’s assets escaped shortly after its launch.122 To mitigate this
risk, future distributed entities may build in additional safeguards,
such as phased rollouts or sandboxing that allow for more strenuous
testing of the code. Even with such additional precautions, use of a
smart contract may be a risky endeavor that investors should care-
fully assess. Notably, the programmer behind The DAO, Christoph
Jentzsch, was himself “an Ethereum veteran with a university
degree in theoretical and mathematical physics.”123 Jentzsch
understood Ethereum and previously worked “as a software tester[,]
[b]ut decentralized code can be exceedingly hard to test. That even
he can trip up, predicts that a lot of people trying their hands at
smart contracts will.”124
121. Kevin Delmolino et al., Step by Step Towards Creating a Safe Smart Contract: Lessons
and Insights from a Cryptocurrency Lab, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY
79, 80 (Jeremy Clark et al. eds., 2016). In this documentation, the researchers explained how
their lab exposed “numerous common pitfalls in designing safe and secure smart contracts,”
and they “document[ed] several typical classes of mistakes students made”; yet they also sug-
gested methods to fix or avoid these types of mistakes “and advocate[ed] best practices for
programming smart contracts.” Id. at 79. 
122. See Norton, supra note 21.
123. DIEDRICH, supra note 41, at 54.
124. Id.
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Nevertheless, distributed organizations may be well-situated to
mitigate risks inherent in building smart contract code structures.
In contrast to more traditional firms, the early stage backers of
distributed business organizations often possess significant
technical sophistication. Their contributions give them a stake in
the organization’s continued success and a strong incentive to test
and prove the entity’s code. Importantly, traditional business
entities also face hacking risks and may have more vulnerable
points than distributed entities.125 Traditional organizations also
face continual threats from social engineering or social hacking,
where hackers manipulate human personnel to gain critical infor-
mation and access.126
2. Free-Rider Problems
Distributed organizations may face free-rider problems.127 A
diffuse entity with many small stakeholders may not function effec-
tively without managing small stakeholder incentives.128 If small
stakeholders reap small benefits from exercising governance rights,
it may be irrational for them to incur the information gathering and
analysis costs necessary for the organization to function effective-
ly.129 
125. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-To-Fail 2.0? Digital Services Providers as
Cyber-Social Systems, 93 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 31-36), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2988284 [https://perma.cc/DH4C-6F7X] (describing why the potential collapse of
certain nonbank entities might have similar impact to that of the too-big-to-fail business
organizations, and describing some of the more acute recent hacks, cybersecurity attacks, and
risks that traditional business entities faced).
126. See CHRISTOPHER HADNAGY, SOCIAL ENGINEERING: THE ART OF HUMAN HACKING 10
(2011) (defining “social engineering” as “the art or better yet, science, of skillfully maneu-
vering human beings to take action in some aspect of their lives”).
127. For a discussion of the free-rider problem in the labor context, see Matthew Dimick,
Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 349 (2012) (“When-
ever the benefits of group action are collective—they cannot be provided to some without
providing them to all—there is an incentive for a member of the group to ‘free ride’ on the
contributions of others and not join or support the group’s efforts.”).
128. Cf. id. at 324-25 (examining the role of labor leadership in encouraging unionization
and preventing the free-rider problem).
129. Even institutional investors with larger holdings often hesitate to incur costs
associated with the exercise of governance rights. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013) (“The governance problem that arises from the
‘separation of ownership from control’ is the undervaluation of the vote as a mechanism to
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Smart contracts may create incentives for stakeholders to
mitigate free-rider problems. One possibility might be to offer
reputational benefits or other rewards for stakeholders incurring
governance costs.130 For example, if stakeholders discuss decisions
through forums, the community could implement mechanisms to
recognize and appropriately reward insightful contributions.131
Another possible strategy might be to adopt a structure with a mix
of large and small stakeholder blocks. The owners of larger stakes
would face stronger incentives to devote resources to governance
issues and somewhat mitigate free-rider problems.
Still, the extent to which the free-rider problem will affect distrib-
uted organizations may depend on their business environments. In
businesses demanding constant attention and decisions, distributed
organizations may struggle because these entities must make
frequent decisions. These elevated decision-making costs may either
cause small stakeholders to sell their stakes, or shirk their decision-
making responsibilities and free ride on the decisions made by
others.132
Distributed entities might also seek to mitigate collective action
problems by relying on predictive algorithms to generate recommen-
dations. In one notable example, a venture capital fund appointed
a predictive computer algorithm to its board, giving it the authority
to vote on funding decisions.133 Still, relying on predictive algorithms
carries significant risk as well: using predictive algorithms to guide
decisions may simply elevate the biases of the persons that designed
the predictive algorithms.134
impose change. The reconcentration of ownership through institutions adds only marginally
to the value of the vote.”).
130. See, e.g., BACKFEED, supra note 86.
131. See, e.g., id.
132. See, e.g., Metz, supra note 1.
133. See Rob Wile, A Venture Capital Firm Just Named an Algorithm to Its Board of Direc-
tors—Here’s What It Actually Does, BUS. INSIDER (May 13, 2014, 11:19 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/vital-named-to-board-2014-5 [https://perma.cc/JM9D-398N].
134. Cf. Julia Angwin, Make Algorithms Accountable, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/08/01/opinion/make-algorithms-accountable.html [https://perma.cc/
85A3-UASB] (“We found the scores ... were biased against black defendants, who were falsely
labeled ... at almost twice the rate of white defendants.”).
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3. Regulatory Risk
Paradigm-breaking distributed organizations also face significant
risks from existing regulatory frameworks, such as federal securi-
ties laws.135 Created in the aftermath of the Great Depression, the
federal securities laws sought to increase transparency in the
marketplace and to protect investors from the worst of the
Depression-era abuses.136 Unless authorized to be sold under an
exemption, securities must be registered with the federal govern-
ment—something that adds substantial expense to any offering.137
Interests in a distributed organization may qualify as secur-
ities.138 The answer in particular cases will depend on how courts
and regulators apply the well-worn Howey test to the new
offerings.139 An investment contract qualifies as a security if: (1)
“individuals were led to invest money”; (2) “in a common enterprise”;
(3) “with the expectation that they would earn a profit”; (4) “solely
through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than
themselves.”140 Judicial decisions have added a substantial interpre-
tive gloss to the test.141 Importantly, to avoid classification as a
security, offerings to join distributed business entities only need to
avoid one of the elements.142 Analysis of whether such offerings
successfully avoid one of the elements
135. In some instances, new entrants may need to alter the regulatory regime to succeed.
For a discussion of this dynamic, see generally Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry,
Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383 (2017) (discussing recent developments
in regulatory entrepreneurship).
136. What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/
Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/A3LZ-QZ2N].
137. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2012) (providing registration requirements).
138. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934:
The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 34,81207, 1-2 (July 25, 2017) (concluding that DAO to-
kens were securities).
139. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
140. Id.
141. See generally Jeffrey Allen Tew & David Freedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of
Securities and the Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 407 (1973) (surveying case law
developments of securities law in the wake of Howey).
142. See id. at 410 (noting that to be defined as a security, all of the elements from Howey
must be present).
28
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 59 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol59/iss1/1
2017] DISTRIBUTED GOVERNANCE 29
is complicated by the fact that the issuance of digital tokens is
often not accompanied by a legally binding document that
clearly spells out the various rights of the token buyer, meaning
the character of the relationship between a token issuer and a
token owner may be governed in large part by disparate
representations, by implication or by common usage.143
In the context of The DAO, for example, the code that operated The
DAO was said to be the contract between The DAO token holders.144
That computer code may or may not be useful for determining
whether the elements of the Howey test are present in The DAO’s
token offering.
Without a written agreement to turn to, the analysis will center
on other facts. In some instances, distributed entities may be able
to solicit new members without requiring them to invest “money.”
While the exchange of a cryptocurrency for a token would likely
qualify as an investment of money, a contribution of computational
power might not.145
While the common enterprise and expectation of profit elements
may be more difficult to avoid, distributed entities with substantial
stakeholder participation may not qualify as securities. The Howey
test requires that expected profits derive “solely from the efforts” of
another.146 Despite the use of the term “solely,” subsequent decisions
have clarified investment contracts that call for marginal amounts
of investor participation will still qualify as securities.147 The more
143. Working Group on Cryptographic Token, supra note 104, at 3.
144. See Matt Levine, Blockchain Company’s Smart Contracts Were Dumb, BLOOMBERG
(June 17, 2016, 5:46 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-17/blockchain-
company-s-smart-contracts-were-dumb [https://perma.cc/MG85-A6H8] (“The terms of The
DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code existing on the Ethereum blockchain
at [code address]. Nothing in this explanation of terms or in any other document or
communication may modify or add any additional obligations or guarantees beyond those set
forth in The DAO’s code. Any and all explanatory terms or descriptions are merely offered for
educational purposes and do not supersede or modify the express terms of The DAO’s code set
forth on the blockchain.” (quoting The DAO website)). 
145. One possibility to avoid an investment of money would be to require new members of
the collective to acquire their interests by contributing computational power and “mining”
their stake. See Marco Santori, Appcoin Law: ICOs the Right Way, COINDESK (Oct. 15, 2016,
2:04 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/appcoin-law-part-1-icos-the-right-way/ [https://perma.cc/
U83L-CELP].
146. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 88-91 (2d Cir. 2008); Robinson v.
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involved stakeholders become, the less likely it will be that a court
will treat an offering as a security.148
4. Public Accountability Concerns
DLT poses unique challenges to traditional government enforce-
ment mechanisms. While a court can order an officer or a director
to take an action, courts may struggle to enforce rulings against dis-
tributed entities.149 When a distributed entity spans the globe and
operates on a consensus basis, an order from one jurisdiction may
not be followed by nodes outside that jurisdiction.150
This creates issues for distributed entities seeking to do business
with more traditional entities. While traditional entities trust that
courts possess the power to enforce most agreements with most
counterparties, distributed entities may share characteristics with
sovereign states.151 If a distributed entity declines to comply with a
court order, it may be difficult to compel its compliance through
ordinary processes.152 Of course, traditional processes with juris-
diction over individual members of a distributed entity may compel
the individual members to act in particular ways.153
Limited access to public enforcement will not affect all dis-
tributed entities equally. The concern for enforcement applies with
less force to distributed entities that primarily interact with other
DLT-driven counterparties.154 Because these entities interact on
even terms, they may experience lower transaction costs.155
Distributed entities may face higher costs when interacting with
Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 169-70 (4th Cir. 2003). 
148. See Robinson, 349 F.3d at 169-70 (“What matters more than the form of an investment
scheme is the ‘economic reality’ that it represents.”).
149. Cf. Bayern, supra note 32, at 1498-99.
150. See Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C.
BANKING INST. 177, 191 (2017).
151. See generally JOSEPH CUTLER ET AL., PERKINS COIE, SELF-SOVEREIGN IDENTITY AND
DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: FRAMING THE LEGAL ISSUES (2017), https://www.virtual
currencyreport.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2017/05/Perkins-Coie-Self-Sovereign-Identity-
and-Distributed-Ledger-Technology_Framing-the-Legal-Issues-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BES-
CUPC] (examining the development of DLT and its accompanying legal issues).
152. Cf. Bayern, supra note 32, at 1498-99.
153. Cf. id.
154. Cf. O’Shields, supra note 150, at 177-78.
155. See id.
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more traditional organizations because traditional entities may de-
mand a direct means to seize collateral.156
CONCLUSION
As DLT and smart contracts continue their rapid development,
more distributed business organizations will undoubtedly emerge.
Their success will depend on their ability to draw upon the unique
strengths of the model while mitigating the significant governance
and enforcement risks posed by broad diffusion of power. After all,
traditional corporate governance principles have served our society
for years in part to accommodate the corporate form within contract
law and, in substantial part, to address the agency problems that
are associated with the agreements that enable the creation of the
corporate form. Distributed business organizations should therefore
consider the role of traditional corporate governance principles in
structuring corporate affairs to achieve these goals.
Such goals should also be kept in mind because, as these technol-
ogies change the business environment, they will also alter the
larger social and political environment. While DLT offers significant
pro-democratic advantages, the technology may also carry unfore-
seen political risks. For example, Bitcoin’s critics have characterized
it as a tool for amplifying and empowering right-wing extremism
and charged that it is designed to instantiate the forms of social
power that make the rich more powerful and keep the poor power-
less.157 Even if not specifically driven by right-wing extremism, some
156. Cf. id. at 185-99.
157. See David Golumbia, Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism, in
MONEYLAB READER: AN INTERVENTION IN DIGITAL ECONOMY 117 (Geert Lovink et al. eds.,
2015), http://networkcultures.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MoneyLab_reader.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HT65-W7WK]. Golumbia explains:
The lack of any valid, non-conspiratorial analysis of our existing financial
systems means that Bitcoin fails to embody any substantial alternative to them.
The reasons for this have little to do with technology and everything to do with
the financial systems in which Bitcoin and all other cryptocurrencies are
embedded, systems that instantiate the forms of social power that cannot be
eliminated through either wishful thinking or technical or even political evasion:
the rich and powerful will not become poor and powerless simply because some
people decide to operate alternate exchange economies. Lacking a robust account
of transforming these systems of power, even without Bitcoin’s flaws, a “perfect”
cryptocurrency would exacerbate, rather than address, the existing serious
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scholars recognize that society always pays a price for technology;
the greater the technology, the greater the price.158
Importantly, significant technological changes may be more ecologi-
cal than additive.159 Instead of simply adding a new tool to the box,
DLT may shift social development into different directions. Given
the risks, policymakers and stakeholders should carefully consider
the different types of worlds DLT might create. These decisions
must be made at the outset. Technology tends to become mythic as
time passes because it is perceived as “part of the natural order of
things,”160 and then it is almost impossible to go back and run our
lives the way we did before the new technology was adopted.
problems with our monetary and financial systems. Because it operates without
such an account, Bitcoin’s real utility and purpose (and that of the crypto-
currency movement in general) can be better understood as a “program” for
recruiting uninformed citizens into a neoliberal and (nominally) anti-govern-
ment political discourse, understanding the nature and effects of which requires
just the attention to political theory and history that Bitcoin enthusiasts rail
against.
Id. at 120.
158. See Neil Postman, Five Things We Need to Know About Technological Change, Re-
marks at The New Technologies and the Human Person Conference in Denver, Colorado (Mar.
28, 1998), http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/classes/188/materials/postman.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T2J2-VQEH].
159. See id.
160. Id.
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